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Russia's typical frames of civilian harm cases in the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war: exploratory frame analysis (2022–2024 data)

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this exploratory study is to preliminarily highlight the key frames that Russia uses within its strategic communication to explain the cases of civilian harm done by its forces in the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war. The main research method applied in the research is the qualitative frame analysis of the messages by Russia's communicators (primarily, state officials) that were spread in 2022 – 2024. The sample of civilian harm cases is identified based on the randomized selection from the Bellingcat dataset. Entman's (1993) analytical framework of the 4 frame functions is used in interpretation of the results. The results show that Russian communicators apply the set of at least three frame types (ignorance, hit military targets, and anti-Russian insinuation) to interpret Russia's war crimes in a favorable light. On the other hand, two more less typical, but important frame types are identified (depersonalized accident and vengeance). The results indicate Russia's attempts to legitimize or reinterpret its war crimes and serve as a theoretical base for further studies of Russia's framing within its strategic communication.

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АНОТАЦІЯ

З початку повномасштабної російсько-української війни у лютому 2022 року в межах своєї стратегічної комунікації Росія намагається фреймувати свої військові злочини, зокрема атаки на цивільних і цивільну інфраструктуру, щоби підтримати цілісність своїх стратегічних наративів, іміду та мінімізувати репутаційні ризики. І хоча науковці приділяють увагу стратегічній комунікації РФ певну увагу, наразі бракує науково й емпірично обґрунтованого знання про те, які саме фрейми використовує Росія для реінтерпретації своїх військових злочинів. Це дослідження позиціонується як розвідувальне дослідження, мета якого – попередньо висвітлити ключові фрейми, які Росія використовує у своїй стратегічній комунікації для пояснення випадків шкоди цивільним, що завдана російськими силами. Ключовим методом дослідження є якісницький фрейм-аналіз повідомлень російських комунікаторів (передусім – посадовців, урядових акторів РФ), що транслювалися у відповідь на випадки шкоди цивільним в Україні у період 2022 – 2024 рр. Вибірка випадків цивільної шкоди (N = 43) відібрана методом рандомізованого вибору (з урахуванням принципів насиченості даних) з масиву даних від Bellingcat. Для інтерпретації результатів використовується аналітична рамка за авторством Entman'a (1993), що висвітлює 4 функції фреймів (визначення проблеми, пояснення каузальності, морально-етична оцінка та пропозиції вирішення проблеми). Результати аналізу свідчать про те, що комунікатори РФ використовують набір з принаймні трьох типових фреймів (ігнорування, удар по військових цілях, антиросійська інсинуація) для інтерпретації злочинів РФ у сприятливому для себе світлі. Водночас, у дослідженні обговорюються ще два види фреймів, які можуть бути не настільки типовими, але теоретично вагомими (деперсоналізований випадок і помста). У статті обговорюються структурні особливості кожного фрейму; узагальнюється, що фрейми спрямовані або на легітимізацію завдання Росією удару по цивільній інфраструктурі, або на суцільну реінтерпретацію події. Результати дослідження, таким чином, пропонують стартову теоретичну основу для подальших досліджень фреймінгу в контексті стратегічної комунікації Росії в умовах повномасштабної війни.

КЛЮЧОВІ СЛОВА: стратегічні наративи, стратегічна комунікація, фреймінг, російсько-українська війна, шкода цивільним, масові комунікації

Introduction

Civilian harm and Russia's strategic communication. Russia's strategic communication is the one which has an essence of information war (Fridman, 2020), hybrid war, and disinformation campaigns (Fridrichová, 2023 based on Kofman, 2016). Hence, within its strategic communication, Russia has been trying to legitimize its 2022's invasion of Ukraine as a response to unlawful actions (Fridrichová, 2023; Bradshaw et al., 2024). Some of such attempts involved promoting strategic narratives of Russia being the victim of the West that merely tries to defend itself from the enemies, as the savior of the Russian-speaking people, and as the promoter of Orthodox values (Snigyr, 2023; Oates & Ramsay, 2024).

On the other hand, it could be argued that Russian war crimes, including civilian harm caused by the Russian army, undermine Russia's strategic narratives and image of morality. Mass shelling, missile strikes, and other types of attacks conducted on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine by definition create a reputational risk for Russia. Nevertheless, as discussed in this article, Russia attempts to re-interpret events that put it in a negative light and hereby to re-construct social reality by specific framing of the events (see, Scheufele, 1999 for the discussion on framing and social reality construction).

While Russia's denial of causing civilian harm has been routinely articulated in media since the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war started on February 24, 2022, there is still a lack of comprehensive evidence- and research-based knowledge of Russian framing's constituency.

Moreover, there is a lack of a generalized, yet sufficient evidence-based picture on the main framing types that Russian communicators engage to explain, distort, deny etc. the civilian harm done by Russia.

Accordingly, the *aim* of this paper is to preliminarily highlight the typical frames that are used by Russia to address civilian harm done by its forces. This research is designed as an exploratory study. Concordantly with the format of this study, qualitative framing analysis based on Entman's (1993) framework is used to uncover some of the typical civilian harm frames. To achieve this goal, the research relies on empirical data from Bellingcat's (n. d.) dataset of civilian harm in Ukraine within the full-scale invasion. While framing is approached as a part of Russia's strategic communication in the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war, the study focuses on the comments issued by Russia's state actors state representatives, and state media.

Civilian harm. The concept of civilian harm has been articulated lately in the context of Russo-Ukrainian war in scholarly articles (e.g., Daniele, 2024), media, by international organizations, and government bodies. For example, it is used by Bellingcat (Bellingcat, n. d.; Bellingcat Investigation Team, 2022), as well the United Nation's reports (UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, 2024). The United States Department of Defense's (2023) instruction defines civilian harm as "Civilian casualties and damage to or destruction of civilian objects (which do not constitute military objectives under the law of war) resulting from military operations" (p. 49). On the other hand, civilian harm is, in fact, not a new term, even though it could be represented by slightly other labels in the field of law. Logically, civilian harm reflects, for example, Article 52 of the Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions (ICRC Database, n. d.): "Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. Civilian objects are all objects which are not military objectives..." A common notion could be found in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (International Criminal Court, 2021), which lists intentional attacks on civilian objects among war crimes.

Frames. Stemming from the works of Goffman (1974/1986) and other theoretical pillars, framing and frames might have been among the most popular concepts and methodological choices in media and communications (Cacciatore, Scheufele, & Iyengar, 2015).

There are several definitions of frames. To name a few examples, from Goffman's (1974/1986) perspective, frames are a set of principles, schemes of knowledge organization and interpretation of events. A frame "suggests a central organizing idea for understanding events related to the issue in question" (Gamson and Lasch, 1980, p. 3). However, some definitions put greater emphasis specifically on media frames (see Scheufele, 1999 for a discussion of frame types and perspectives). Gitlin (1980) defines (media) frames as "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual" (Gitlin, 1980, p. 7). On the other hand, according to a widely cited definition by Entman (1993, p. 52),

Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.

A frame might have all four of these functions or only some of them (Entman, 1993).

However, frames might be elements of wider phenomena – strategic narratives (Coticchia & Catanzaro, 2020; Livingston and Nassetta, 2018), which, in their turn, function as "tools for political actors to extend their influence, manage expectations, and change the discursive environment in which they operate" (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, & Roselle, 2013, p. 2). Yet, as concluded by Miskimmon et al. (2013), "various components of a narrative must be framed a certain way, so framing must be taken into account" (p. 7). And if frames are elements of strategic narratives, frames could be viewed as a part of a state's strategic communication. While this article is not focused on examining relationships between Russia's framing of civilian harm and Russia's

strategic communication principles in detail, the key notion here is that Russia uses framing as a tool of managing its image strategically and supporting strategic narratives.

Method

For the purpose of the research, exploratory qualitative frame analysis was used to highlight Russia's typical frames in the coverage of civilian harm events.

Empirical data and sampling. Bellingcat's (n. d.) "Civilian Harm in Ukraine Timemap" project dataset was used as the empirical source of civilian harm events (the dataset is a downloadable open-access database that could be exported in a CSV file format). It lists cases of civilian harm in the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war since February 24, 2022, collected and verified by the Bellingcat (the dataset that was used for this study was dated as September 17, 2024, thus it included cases that occurred between February 24, 2022, and the middle of September 2024).

For each case in the dataset, there are variables that include information like, for example, date of the event, geographical location, source to the source media publications which Bellingcat relied on to document the event (it should be noted that in this paper, alternative media sources on the same event might be used in media references), brief information on the damages. However, a few methodological pre-cautions should be made. Firstly, the dataset does not always include media reactions from Russia's state representatives (basically, Russia's framing messages themselves). Consequently, Russian communicators' comments/statements regarding the event would be collected additionally. Secondly, usually, a case in the dataset represents a separate case of civilian harm, which may have happened among other cases within a given occasion of, say, shelling. In other words, if a hypothetical shelling of a city included damage to a) a hospital and b) an apartment block, these two sub-events might appear as two separate cases in the dataset. Thirdly, the focus of this research is events of civilian harm (severe damage, attack on civilian infrastructure etc.) inflicted by Russia on the territory of Ukraine. Accordingly, only the cases that correspond to these criteria would be selected for the analysis.

Events were selected via simple random sampling from the Bellingcat's dataset. This type of sampling might not highlight the largest variation of frames and was sometimes criticized as a tool in qualitative studies (see Morse, 1995; Marshall, 1996). Hence, rare frames may not occur with the random sample. However, firstly, random sampling conveniently fits the aims of this research – to provide a general outlook on some of the most typical frames. Firstly, random selection is mean of a more unbiased and generalizable approach (see Palinkas, 2015 for the discussion) towards naming some of the common frames, whereas the study does not attempt to give representative results or mention all the existing Russian frames. Secondly, to address some of Marshall's (1996) critical points, the dataset of civilian harm cases allows the application of actual simple random sample, contrary to some studies of large human populations like country population. Thirdly, this research follows the logic that if a frame is typical, it would emerge at least a few times in the qualitative exploratory sample. Yet, if dozens of frames are analyzed, and the frame does not occur or it emerges as an exception, possibly, this frame is not very typical.

With consideration of common data saturation principles (for discussion of data saturation concept and approaches, see Marshall, 1996; Saunders et al., 2018; Tight, 2024), overall, 43 cases were analyzed. New frames stopped appearing around case #25, thus it could be considered a point after which exploratory data saturation was reached. Yet, cases would be analyzed until case 43 to ensure that no new frames would emerge in the nearby cases. Also, about 30 randomly pre-defined cases were excluded from the analysis (those were invalid data cases, cases with invalid source links, cases that could not be verified, cases that did not correspond to the formal criteria and focus of the research).

Then, based on the information from the dataset, the search in the open sources was conducted for Russia's communicators' comments on each selected event. While this study views framing in the context of Russia's strategic communication, the empirical pool of texts relies on statements made by Russia's state actors/representatives (primarily, the Russian Ministry of Defense, MoD,

and its official spokespersons). It is pre-assumed that Russian media spreads the messages that originate from the state’s agenda. In case the state officials did not issue comments on the event, the comment would be taken from the Russian state media (TASS, for instance). To elaborate, Russian propagandists could be viewed as proxies of the state communication.

Analysis procedures. Qualitative frame analysis was conducted in a manner of inductive qualitative coding. This means that initial codes were assigned for each event’s Russian communicating text, succeeded by the further inductive generalization. Furthermore, Entman’s (1993) analytical framework was used to provide more detailed insight. Namely, each frame was analyzed in regard to the four possible framing functions (Entman, 1993, p. 52):

- problem definition – “determine what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of common cultural values,”
- causal interpretation – “identify the forces creating the problem,”
- moral evaluation – “evaluate causal agents and their effects,”
- treatment recommendation – “offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects.”

Results

Overall, 3 typical frames were induced from the exploratory sample (Table 1).

Table 1. Typical frames used by Russia to explain civilian harm done by its forces, based on Entman’s (1993) analytical approach.

Frame	Problem definition	Causal interpretation	Moral evaluation	Treatment recommendation
Ignorance (and partial ignorance)	Nothing happened in terms of civilian harm	-	-	-
Hit military targets	Russia hit legitimate targets – military targets	Ukraine placed its military objects – Russia targeted them	Russia’s actions are justful and legitimate	-
Anti-Russian insinuation	Ukraine is orchestrating an anti-Russian insinuation by harming (endangering) civilians	Ukraine and Western allies (journalists, media) are preparing insinuation	Ukraine commits immoral actions and war crimes to make false accusations	Public must not believe that information or put the blame on Russia

Ignorance. In several cases, no statements by the Russian officials or state media were found regarding civilian harm events. It could be assumed that Russia did not deny an event explicitly but ignored the event at all in its communication. It might be debatable whether not mentioning something at all is a frame by itself. However, in the case of Russia’s state-defined strategic communication, where every message is supposed to serve some strategic goal, it could be argued that “frames are defined by what they omit as well as include” (Entman, 1993, p. 54, relying on Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Concordantly, the frame is used in a way to omit the event from the context of civilian harm – as if nothing like that happened.

For instance, Kherson Regional administration reported¹ that between December 31, 2022, and January 1, 2023, Russia shelled Kherson, killing at least one person. However, no comments on that attack from Russia's communicators were found.

While in some cases Russian communicators totally ignore the event, on some other occasions they relied on partial ignorance. It means that while civilian damage itself was not mentioned in communication, the area, region, direct, etc. where the attack happened was mentioned in a different light. Provided that, Russia's attack on civilian objects is excluded from the communication, whereas more Russia-favoring information of the events in the area is given.

"Partial ignorance" might be called a "pseudo-frame": it does not work as a separate autonomous frame, but it is used in combination with other frames and adds important features for the understanding of the events. For example, when Russia shelled the central market area of Kherson on April 18, 2023², Russian MoD did not mention the attack directly. Nevertheless, Russian MoD posted a statement³ about hitting on the Kherson direction in general (a combination with a "hit military targets" frame):

"On the Kherson direction, in the process of target engagement, more than 25 Ukrainian servicemen, three automobiles, an American-produced M777 artillery system, as well as two D-30 howitzers were destroyed over the last day"

Hit military targets. This frame builds up on the following logic: Ukraine placed military targets, these targets are legitimate, so Russia hit those targets. The frame thus omits the fact that civilian objects were damaged or claims that civilian objects were in fact Ukrainian military objects. Either way, Russian communication emphasizes that "real" civilian damage has not happened and that military targets (possibly, located within civilian areas and buildings) were hit.

For example, it was reported that on July 10, 2023, Russian army attacked civilians that gathered around humanitarian aid station in the town of Orikhiv with guided missile strike⁴. And the statement by Russia's MoD civilian damage was not acknowledged, yet it was claimed that Ukrainian Armed Forces' command post was struck⁵:

"In the area of town Orekhov in Zaporozhye oblast, command post of the 47th motorized brigade of the UAF was hit"

In a slightly different variation, the frame blurs the line between civilian objects and military objects, once again proposing that the attack was legitimate. In such way, the frame was used to interpret Russian strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure on October 10, 2022⁶ and shelling of Mykolaiv on June 21, 2022⁷. For those events, Russian MoD stated:

"Today, mass strike on the objects of military command, communication, and energy system of Ukraine was conducted with high-precision, long-range weapons by Russian armed forces. The goal of the strike was reached. All assigned targets were hit"⁸

"The enemy suffers heavy losses. On June 21, as a result of high-precision weapon strike by the Aerospace Forces of Russia, up to 500 servicemembers of the 59th motorized brigade of the UAF with

¹ <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/2852>

² <https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/18/ukraine-war-live-updates-latest-news-on-russia-and-the-war-in-ukraine.html>

³ https://t.me/mod_russia/25762

⁴ <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russian-war-report-russian-airstrike-hits-humanitarian-aid-station>

⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/28239

⁶ <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-government-and-politics-8f625861590b9e0dd336dabc0880ac8c>

⁷ <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/seven-russian-missiles-hit-ukrainian-city-mykolaiv-regional-governor-2022-06-22/>

⁸ https://t.me/mod_russia/20714

their weapons and army vehicles that were located in the workshops of Nikolayev Shipyard 'Okean' were destroyed"¹

Logically, the proposed moral evaluation is that Russia's actions are legitimate, because military targets are legitimate targets. Notably, though, this frame might not provide a clear implication on problem solution. By definition, from Russia's standpoint, the attack is a success by itself.

Anti-Russian insinuation. By using this frame, Russia's communicators address an event of civilian harm but position it as Ukraine's operation and false accusation of Russia. Noticeably, such frame might be applied in advance – as if Russia issues a warning about upcoming insinuation by Ukraine. Accordingly, fake scenery or a potential war crime/false flag operation could be communicated.

As an example, on the day of Russia's shelling of Kharkiv on March 4, 2022, Russian MoD "warned" about Ukraine-orchestrated provocation with the involvement of Western media²:

"Ukrainian nationalists are preparing a provocation with the participation of Western journalists in Kharkov. According to confirmed data, on Zhilardi Street, Kievsky District, in the private sector, multiple launch rocket systems are placed between the houses. Nationalists forbid local residents, including children, to leave their homes... The purpose of the provocation is to cause the return fire of Russian artillery on the residential sector of Kharkov. All this is planned to be filmed on cameras with the subsequent transfer to Western journalists"

Another example is Russia's framing of its attack on civilian convoys on May 4, 2022, in Kharkiv Oblast (by that time, Russia had been retreating from Kharkiv). Russia was reported to have targeted two civilian convoys and to have killed about five civilians (including 13-year-old girl)³. However, Mikhail Mizintsev, then-Head of the National Defense Management Center of the Russian Federation, issued a statement in which he blamed the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the attack⁴:

"According to the available reliable information, in the Kharkiv region the Kiev regime held another bloody action according to the "Buchinsky" scenario. On the road section between the settlements of Stary and New Saltov, soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine shot six civilian cars which had white flags mounted on them [...] We warn you in advance that soon, these and other Kiev regime-fabricated materials about alleged "Russians' outrage" are planned to be spread widely via the western and Ukrainian mass media as well as via internet resources"

Respectively, in such way, Russian speakers and/or media communicate civilian harm and killings of civilians as Ukrainian insinuation/provocation, atrocity by the AFU, and attempt to put the blame on Russia. Ukraine is thus blamed for the civilian harm, whereas the western media are co-blamed for participating in the insinuation. The frame involves viewing the event as an atrocity, a bloody, unlawful action, and, basically, an act of civilian harm. Finally, the "solution" that Russian speakers imply within this frame is, accordingly, not to believe the information about Russia's war crime.

Other possible frames. Some frames appeared in the sample only once or twice. Such frequency on the exploratory stage does not provide sufficient evidence to label them as typical frames. However, these frames (Table 2) might be worth mentioning for further scientific investigations. Possibly, these frames were used by Russia more as an exception. For example, it could be assumed that such frames could have been used in the most extreme cases of Russia's war crimes that caused even more uproar and media coverage.

¹ https://t.me/mod_russia/17024

² https://india.mid.ru/en/news/updates_from_the_russian_defence_ministry_february_24_april_4_2022/

³ <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/13/europe/ukraine-russia-kharkiv-atrocities-intl/index.html>

⁴ <https://www.newsweek.com/how-russian-media-telling-ukraine-war-story-monday-april-18-1698774>

Table 2. Other possible frames used by Russia to explain civilian harm done by its forces, based on Entman’s (1993) analytical approach.

Frame	Problem definition	Causal interpretation	Moral evaluation	Treatment recommendation
Depersonalized incident	Something “just” happened	-	-	-
Vengeance	Retaliation strike	Ukraine’s previous unlawful action caused Russia to retaliate	Attack is legitimate, as Russia as attacked first	Ukraine must stop attacking Russia’s territory/facilities

The “depersonalized accident” frame implies that civilian harm-related event happened, but it is just a plain fact with no other details or accountability for the harm. Hence, Russian communicators simply acknowledge that some sort of incident happened, but do not attribute the attack directly to themselves or any other side. For example, when Russia attacked ports in Odesa oblast (including those in the towns of Reni and Izmail) with drones on July 24, 2023, Russian state media TASS only mentioned that “explosions were heard”¹:

“Explosions are heard in the town of Izmail, which is located in Odessa Oblast. The news was reported by the media ‘Mirror of the Week’. Izmail is a large port on the Danube. Earlier the explosions were reported by the media “Dumskaya”. According to the official public [air raid alert] notification resource, air raid alert was announced in the region”

This frame informs of the incident, yet it does not give any moral judgement or further implications. On the surface, neither does the frame attribute accountability for the civilian harm to any actor. However, by depersonalizing Russia’s attack, the frame lifts responsibility for the attack from Russia. In other words, the frame implies that “it is not Russia that caused the explosions – it is just that something exploded”.

On the other hand, the “vengeance” frame does not deny or omit mentions of Russia’s involvement in the civilian harm event. On the contrary, this frame is used to interpret the attack as retaliation against Ukraine. To provide an example, once again, commenting on October 10, 2022’s Russian massive missile attack on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, Russian president Vladimir Putin issued the statement saying that the air strike was a response to an explosion on the Crimea bridge (which happened days before) and accused Ukraine of attempting terrorist-like attacks on Russia’s critical infrastructure²:

“In such way, with their actions, Kiev regime put themselves in one line with international terrorist groups [...] Leaving such kind of crimes without response is just impossible anymore. This morning, based on suggestion of the Ministry of Defense and according to Russia’s General staff’s plans, a mass strike on Ukraine’s objects of energy infrastructure, military command, and communication was conducted with high-precision, long-range weapons”

From this point of view, the causality implied by Russian frames is that Ukraine’s previous unlawful attacks caused Russia to retaliate. The frame thus puts the responsibility on Ukraine and evaluates Russia’s attack as a legitimate and rightful action. Moreover, the frame implies that to fix the issue, Ukraine must stop targeting Russia’s facilities and territories in self-defense.

¹ <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/18343679>

² <http://special.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/UA/events/69568>

Conclusions

The objective of this paper is to identify and analyze the typical frames employed by Russia in the interpretation of civilian harm events. By doing so, the study aims to establish an initial evidence-based understanding of Russia's framing strategies within this context.

Russian communicators use a set of typical frames to re-interpret Russia's attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. Some of the frames (like the "hit military targets frame") are aimed at legitimizing the attack by stating that it was lawful, straightforward legitimate, and did not intentionally harm civilians. Other frames (like full "ignorance" and "anti-Russian insinuation" frames) work in a slightly different manner – by "lifting" responsibility for the civilian harm from Russia and by either distorting the event (in case of "ignorance") or putting the blame on Ukraine (in the case of the "anti-Russian insinuation" frame). Also, the "partial ignorance" pseudo-frame was found, which operates more as an element of combined frames.

Moreover, a couple of frames that might not be very typical were highlighted. "The vengeance" frame also legitimizes civilian harm by making focus on retaliation and being forced to attack in response. Yet, "depersonalized accident" acknowledges civilian harm, but interprets it as a "it just happened"-event, once again, lifting responsibility from Russia.

Nevertheless, Russia's framing strategies are not necessarily limited to the content of this set. On the contrary, the study suggests that there are several perspectives in further research on Russia's civilian harm framing within its strategic communication. Firstly, sampling might need to be expanded using other complementary approaches (like studying extreme cases, using a maximum variation sample, etc.). And as it was mentioned earlier, Bellingcat dataset lists separate cases of various civilian harm events, and it could be assumed that most of those did not have large-volume, high-intensity media coverage compared to, for example, the strikes on "Okhmatdyt" children's hospital or Mariupol theatre. Accordingly, more civilian harm events that caused even more intensive coverage and reactions should be considered for research. It is possible that more frame types could be detected in those cases. Secondly, more detailed analysis (perhaps, from the deductive perspective as well) might be helpful to provide a better understanding of how ignorance of frames/pseudo-frames work. Thirdly, it would be reasonable to study the structure of Russia's framing of civilian harm from a quantitative approach as well – thus, to highlight frequencies and possible correlations with the frame types. Yet, this study provides baseline knowledge for further investigations.

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